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Telecommunication prices are vastly different across regions in China. This paper 
aims to identify the determinants that affect regional pricing behavior of China 
telecom operators. Using regional telecommunication data of 31 provinces and 
autonomous regions in China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) during 2002–
2011, we identified several factors which affect the regional price differences. The 
findings provide insights on the working of China telecommunication industry and 
have implications for firms’ marketing strategies and government policies. 
1. Introduction 
China telecommunication market is dominated by state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), and has been regulated by the central government. The market reform in 
the industry has led to changes in firms’ ownership from solely state-owned 
companies to publicly traded corporations with majority equity participation of the 
government. These companies are listed and traded in Shanghai, China and off-
shore’s equity markets of Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchange. The market 
reform has introduced more competition, technology upgrading, an increase in 
economies of scale, and consolidation in the industry. In 2007, there were 6 firms 
to compete in the Telecommunication industry and in 2008 there were only five. 
Since 2008, the intra industry rivalry of China telecommunication sector has 
evolved into an oligopolistic market structure that consists of only three players 
(China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom) as a result of mergers and 
consolidations (refer to Table 1). 
Table 1. Chinese telecom market in 2007, 2009 and 2014 
(Revenue in billion RMB/USD) 


































159.1/23.3 17.83% 284.7/45.9 22.77% 





























1.7/0.2 0.28%      
Notes: 
1. China Netcom was merged with China Unicom after reconstruction in 2008. China Satellite 
Telecom was merged with China Telecom; and China Railcom was merged into China 
Mobile in the same year. 2. Data source: For 2007 and 2009 data, it is based on research of 
Y.D. Qi (2011). For 2014 data, it is based on the Annual reports of listed companies in 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, i.e. China Telecom (0728.HK), China Mobile (00941.HK) and 
China Unicom (0762.HK). 
2. Based on the onshore nominal exchange rate by the end of a corresponding year, i.e. one 
dollar equals to RMB 7.3037 in 2007, 6.8271 in 2009 and 6.2048 in 2014. 
Telecommunication price was regulated by the central government in China. 
Before Aug. 2014, the regulated price level in the industry was based on the cost 
level of the industry under the principle of protecting consumers’ interests and 
promoting universal service, especially in poor regions. As a national strategic and 
life-line industry, this sector has gone through continuous reform; the government 
policy has been trying to balance among three objectives of free market competition, 
state industrial development policy and affordability of its citizens, especially in 
lower income and higher cost regions. Prior to the entry of China in the WTO, the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII) was created in 1997 to break up government 
monopoly, to create a level playing field, to foster free competition, and to reduce 
market failure. At the same time, the government has been trying to promote 
universal service, ensure market stability/order, reduce harmful competition, and 
nurture national champions in this industry (Pearson, 2005; Yu, Berg, and Guo, 
2004). To increase competition and to maintain market order at the same time, the 
government policy increased competition by breaking down the monopoly into 
several firms but at the same time limiting the number of competitors in the 
industry. Three telecom firms were divided and allowed to compete in regional 
markets. China’s regional markets are highly segmented not only by local 
governments’ protectionism but also by regional differences in purchasing power, 
consumer attitudes, and communication technology infrastructue (Cui and Liu, 
2000). In this context and under the regulated price cap of the central government, 
firms competed and charged different prices across regions. Study shows that in this 
segmented and regulated market firm’s strategic choices matter and can make a big 
difference (Lufeng, 2016). By international comparison, China telecom industry is 
the most concentrated in the world in terms of market size and population served by 




Table 2. International Comparison by market size (population), industry 




Numbers of firms in the 
Telecom Industry 
Population (in millions) 
per firm served 
US 263 > 20 < 13.15 
Canada 29.7 3 9.9 
UK 58.8 5 11.76 
France 58.5 3 11.7 
Germany 81.6 4 20.4 
Japan 125 3 25.0 
Russia 148 > 4 < 37 
Brazil 161 > 10 < 16 
India 938 22 43 
China 1295 3 432 
Source: Y.D. Qi, 2011 
Note: Above is a simple market size comparison and assumes that the entire population is 
provided service, and that each person has exactly one line. 
Even though there are only three firms in the industry, they operate across 
different administrative regions, provinces and municipalities. These regional 
locations are different with respect to market conditions and local regulations. Hence 
the pricing competitions are shown basically at regional level. Since these regional 
markets are so segmented (e.g. via roaming charges) that there are no arbitrage 
opportunities, the price discrimination becomes possible and persistent. This 
practice and price differentials across regions have faced many concerns and 
criticism from consumers. There is little empirical research examining this 
phenomena of regional pricing differences in China. This paper seeks to fill the gap 
in the literature by seeking answers to the following questions: what is the extent of 
price differences across regions in China? Are these differences due to differences in 
regional living standards? What are the major factors affecting telecommunication 
price discrimination across regions? 
2. Literature Review 
According to Nicholson (1999), “A monopoly firm engages in price 
discrimination, if it is able to sell otherwise identical units of output at different 
prices.” Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2008) have expressed price discrimination as 
“Ideally, a firm would like to charge a different price to each of its customers”. 
Tirole (1988) states that a producer price-discriminates when two units of the 
same physical good are sold at different prices, either to the same consumer or to 
different consumers. 
Based on these definitions and firms’ price discriminating practices, price 
discrimination can be classified into the first, second and third degrees of price 
discrimination. The first-degree is perfect price discrimination; it refers to a situation 
where a producer succeeds in capturing the entire consumer surplus. The second-
degree discrimination is that a producer extracts consumer surplus imperfectly by 
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using the self-selecting devices. The third-degree discrimination is matching the 
customers’ preferences to price (Tirole, 1988). Among them, the third-degree price 
discrimination is the most popular one in practice. 
Researchers often focus on the relationship between price discrimination and 
market concentration. Holmes (1989), Borenstein and Rose(1994), and Barron, 
Taylor and Umbeck (2004) found a negative relationship between them. That means 
price discrimination will be greater when market competition is more intensive. Gale 
and Holemes (1993) argued that there was more room for price discrimination in 
duopoly market than in perfect monopoly market since in a perfectly competitive 
market there are no barriers for arbitrage opportunities, and thus the price 
discrimination practice is not sustainable. Price discrimination prevails when there is 
oligopoly market structure and/or when market can be segmented. Lewis (2008) 
observed that price discrimination is negatively correlated with market concentration 
in low-price market segment, whereas price discrimination has a weakly positive 
relationship with market concentration in high-price market segment. However, 
there is no consensus regarding market concentration and price discrimination. 
In China, researchers of price discrimination in telecommunication market have 
focused on the following areas. Along the same line as previous studies, researchers 
like Gan and Niu (2003) have studied three degrees of price discriminations. 
Concerned about the social and economic impacts of price discrimination, Su (2013) 
has argued that price discrimination practice limits free competition, distorts free 
market mechanism, treats customers unfairly, misallocates resources, promotes 
regional protectionism, and creates barriers for national market integration. On the 
opposite side, Dai (2008) has argued that price discrimination has income transfers 
effect and improves the welfare of low income groups in the society. Hence it 
promotes social fairness. 
Focusing on firms and its market conditions, Hu and Qu (2013) studied 
relationship between firms’ price discrimination practice and firms’ market power & 
market segmentation to see whether market arbitrage opportunities are present. 
Zheng (2007) has argued that pricing based on consumption or demand elasticity is 
the proper pricing strategies in using price discrimination. Wei (2005) has offered 
different operational strategies for each of the three degrees of price discrimination. 
For instance, using auction for selling telephone numbers for the first-degree 
discrimination in pricing; using discount for call durations, volume and peak time 
for the second-degree discrimination in pricing; and using branding, services, and 
products differentiations for the third-degree discrimination in pricing. 
Price discrimination is an important tool for telecom firms to earn abnormal 
profits (Xu, 2013). Dirk, Brooks and Morris (2015) have suggested, after they 
analyzed the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional 
information about consumers’ tastes, that the market segmentation and pricing 
induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of 
consumer and producer surplus. 
In short, with high fixed cost, low marginal cost and network effect, 
telecommunication companies have certain pricing power. At the same time, price 
discrimination would provide more options for customers. However, none of these 
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studies has studied regional pricing discrimination and its determinants. To this end, 
our study aims to fill in this gap. 
3. Data and Measurement 
In this research, our data sample are from 31 provinces and autonomous 
regions in China during 2002–2011 (without Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau). All 
the data come from the Industry and Economic Database in China, Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology publications, Annual Report of China 
Communications Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, and Provinces’ & 
Autonomous Regions’ Statistical Yearbook. 
To measure the telecom price index Pit and the regional price discrimination 
index ∆Pit, we adopted the approach from Wang and Zhao (2003) to measure Pit and 
from Hosken, McMillan, and Taylor (2008) to measure ∆Pit. 
 (1) 
where Pit is telecom price index for region i in year t and P is a price level 
indicator. α is the model intercept, βi is the regional coefficient, ∅i is the time 
coefficient, and εit is an error term. Based on the regression equation (1), the panel 
data regression was conducted. The results are reported in Table 3. In the 
computation, Beijing=0 and year 2002=0 for these two independent dummy 
variables of “Region” and “year”. 





adjR2 : 0.35, F-statistic : 86.71 
*** P < 0.01; ** P < 0.05; * P < 0.01 
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Based on formula (2), the regional telecom price differences across 31 provinces and 
autonomous regions during 2002–2011 are calculated using formula (3). 
∆Pit = Pit −  (3) 
We used ∆Pit to measure the regional price discrimination index. The results for 
each region and year are shown in Table 4. From Table 4, it is clear that the year 
2007 is a turning point, when the price level was declining in almost all regions 
across China. Interestingly, so is the case for national level prices as shown in the 
bottom row. Please note the "national” values in this row are not the average of all 
regions in above columns, rather it is calculated based on China as a whole for each 
year respectively. Shanghai was the laggard one to catch up with this trend. The 
2007 is the first year after the industry consolidation from 7 to 6 companies. The 
competition put downward pressure on the price from that year onward and 
consumers benefitted from this development. To verify the above results, we also 
conducted a robustness test for measuring the regional price discrimination index by 
an alternative approach in which we used Beijing in the year 2002 as the benchmark, 
(refer to equation number 4). The calculated results is shown in Table 5. 
∆PB2 = Pit − PBeijing2002 (4) 
Results presented in table 5 confirm an overall declining price level across 
regions despite an increase in the industry concentration from seven firms in 2006 to 
three in 2009. The overall price decline might have been contributed by technology 
upgrading, network effect, diminishing marginal cost, and liberalization of the 
market. In order to study regional pricing discrimination and its determinants, we 
used regional price discrimination index (i.e. data in Table 4 and 5) as dependent 






Table 4. The regional telecom price discrimination index (∆Pit) by region and 
year 
Year/Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Beijing -0.021 0.372 0.298 0.206 0.075 -0.074 -0.133 -0.192 -0.249 -0.282 
Tianjin -0.048 0.241 0.168 0.145 0.017 -0.067 -0.092 -0.102 -0.138 -0.156 
Liaoning -0.051 0.316 0.213 0.138 0.068 0.011 -0.026 -0.067 -0.130 -0.158 
Shanghai 0.273 0.509 0.440 0.359 0.214 0.102 0.046 0.028 -0.015 -0.066 
Jiangsu 0.163 0.392 0.299 0.181 0.071 0.007 -0.039 -0.066 -0.112 -0.137 
Zhejiang 0.060 0.281 0.130 0.076 0.026 -0.028 -0.066 -0.088 -0.129 -0.153 
Fujian -0.045 0.214 0.060 0.018 -0.024 -0.069 -0.077 -0.105 -0.145 -0.171 
Shandong 0.023 0.376 0.215 0.089 -0.012 -0.060 -0.102 -0.123 -0.163 -0.186 
Guangdong 0.053 0.303 0.096 0.023 -0.037 -0.059 -0.096 -0.126 -0.172 -0.194 
Hainan -0.046 0.328 0.117 0.078 0.004 -0.044 -0.095 -0.117 -0.149 -0.166 
Hebei -0.018 0.263 0.116 0.061 0.020 -0.051 -0.100 -0.131 -0.168 -0.182 
Shanxi 0.040 0.310 0.150 0.116 0.073 -0.013 -0.080 -0.105 -0.145 -0.174 
Jilin -0.059 0.205 0.053 0.005 -0.076 -0.113 -0.134 -0.153 -0.194 -0.213 
Heilongjiang -0.089 0.213 0.094 0.050 -0.005 -0.076 -0.109 -0.135 -0.169 -0.194 
Anhui -0.075 0.318 0.190 0.129 0.064 0.011 -0.044 -0.088 -0.123 -0.148 
Jiangxi -0.090 0.259 0.092 0.022 -0.008 -0.065 -0.109 -0.146 -0.167 -0.180 
Henan 0.004 0.280 0.089 0.032 -0.032 -0.087 -0.124 -0.149 -0.173 -0.190 
Hubei 0.022 0.325 0.175 0.081 0.041 -0.021 -0.073 -0.093 -0.138 -0.161 
Hunan -0.069 0.257 0.154 0.092 0.012 -0.051 -0.091 -0.105 -0.150 -0.174 
Neimenggu -0.072 0.244 0.095 0.052 -0.020 -0.106 -0.149 -0.161 -0.184 -0.214 
Guangxi -0.035 0.252 0.028 -0.021 -0.040 -0.077 -0.118 -0.139 -0.164 -0.181 
Chongqing 0.070 0.297 0.171 0.093 -0.005 -0.086 -0.106 -0.123 -0.160 -0.183 
Sichuan 0.001 0.373 0.214 0.095 0.021 -0.043 -0.083 -0.123 -0.164 -0.186 
Guizhou -0.160 0.146 0.088 0.025 -0.028 -0.073 -0.108 -0.146 -0.179 -0.225 
Yunnan -0.063 0.218 0.100 0.041 -0.005 -0.095 -0.128 -0.146 -0.177 -0.191 
Xizang 0.397 0.662 0.453 0.326 0.207 0.076 -0.003 -0.022 -0.103 -0.130 
Shaanxi 0.040 0.310 0.150 0.116 0.073 -0.013 -0.080 -0.105 -0.145 -0.174 
Gangsu 0.002 0.251 0.125 0.057 0.011 -0.060 -0.114 -0.145 -0.176 -0.201 
Qinghai -0.020 0.267 0.208 0.132 0.085 0.009 -0.101 -0.097 -0.173 -0.199 
Ningxia -0.101 0.228 0.140 0.077 0.010 -0.069 -0.105 -0.130 -0.170 -0.184 
Xinjiang -0.089 0.230 0.107 0.078 -0.006 -0.077 -0.115 -0.162 -0.188 -0.198 
China 0.013 0.309 0.176 0.084 0.016 -0.041 -0.088 -0.115 -0.154 -0.177 
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Table 5. The regional telecom price discrimination index (∆PB2) by region and year 
Year/Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Beijing 0.000 0.019 -0.061 -0.160 -0.301 -0.462 -0.525 -0.589 -0.650 -0.686 
Tianjin -0.229 -0.323 -0.401 -0.425 -0.563 -0.654 -0.681 -0.691 -0.731 -0.750 
Liaoning -0.232 -0.242 -0.353 -0.433 -0.509 -0.570 -0.610 -0.654 -0.722 -0.752 
Shanghai 0.116 -0.035 -0.108 -0.195 -0.352 -0.472 -0.533 -0.552 -0.597 -0.652 
Jiangsu -0.002 -0.160 -0.260 -0.387 -0.505 -0.575 -0.624 -0.652 -0.702 -0.730 
Zhejiang -0.113 -0.280 -0.442 -0.500 -0.554 -0.612 -0.653 -0.676 -0.721 -0.746 
Fujian -0.226 -0.351 -0.518 -0.562 -0.607 -0.656 -0.665 -0.695 -0.737 -0.765 
Shandong -0.152 -0.177 -0.351 -0.486 -0.595 -0.646 -0.691 -0.714 -0.757 -0.782 
Guangdong -0.120 -0.256 -0.479 -0.557 -0.621 -0.646 -0.685 -0.717 -0.767 -0.791 
Hainan -0.227 -0.229 -0.456 -0.498 -0.577 -0.630 -0.684 -0.708 -0.742 -0.760 
Hebei -0.196 -0.298 -0.457 -0.516 -0.560 -0.637 -0.689 -0.722 -0.762 -0.777 
Shanxi -0.134 -0.248 -0.421 -0.457 -0.503 -0.596 -0.668 -0.694 -0.738 -0.769 
Jilin -0.241 -0.362 -0.525 -0.577 -0.664 -0.703 -0.726 -0.746 -0.791 -0.811 
Heilongjiang -0.273 -0.353 -0.480 -0.528 -0.587 -0.663 -0.699 -0.727 -0.763 -0.790 
Anhui -0.258 -0.240 -0.378 -0.443 -0.513 -0.570 -0.629 -0.676 -0.714 -0.741 
Jiangxi -0.274 -0.304 -0.483 -0.559 -0.590 -0.652 -0.699 -0.739 -0.761 -0.775 
Henan -0.173 -0.281 -0.486 -0.547 -0.616 -0.676 -0.715 -0.742 -0.767 -0.786 
Hubei -0.153 -0.232 -0.394 -0.494 -0.537 -0.605 -0.660 -0.682 -0.730 -0.755 
Hunan -0.251 -0.305 -0.416 -0.483 -0.569 -0.637 -0.679 -0.695 -0.743 -0.769 
Neimenggu -0.255 -0.320 -0.480 -0.526 -0.603 -0.696 -0.742 -0.755 -0.779 -0.812 
Guangxi -0.215 -0.311 -0.552 -0.604 -0.625 -0.665 -0.708 -0.731 -0.758 -0.776 
Chongqing -0.102 -0.262 -0.398 -0.481 -0.587 -0.674 -0.696 -0.714 -0.754 -0.779 
Sichuan -0.176 -0.180 -0.352 -0.480 -0.559 -0.628 -0.671 -0.714 -0.758 -0.782 
Guizhou -0.349 -0.425 -0.487 -0.555 -0.612 -0.660 -0.698 -0.739 -0.774 -0.824 
Yunnan -0.245 -0.347 -0.474 -0.538 -0.587 -0.684 -0.719 -0.739 -0.772 -0.787 
Xizang 0.250 0.130 -0.094 -0.232 -0.359 -0.500 -0.585 -0.606 -0.693 -0.722 
Shaanxi -0.291 -0.333 -0.513 -0.603 -0.662 -0.695 -0.723 -0.737 -0.765 -0.783 
Gangsu -0.175 -0.311 -0.447 -0.521 -0.570 -0.646 -0.705 -0.738 -0.771 -0.798 
Qinghai -0.198 -0.295 -0.358 -0.440 -0.491 -0.572 -0.690 -0.687 -0.768 -0.796 
Ningxia -0.286 -0.337 -0.432 -0.499 -0.571 -0.656 -0.694 -0.722 -0.765 -0.780 
Xinjiang -0.273 -0.334 -0.467 -0.497 -0.589 -0.665 -0.705 -0.756 -0.784 -0.794 




4. Regional Pricing Discrimination and its Determinants 
In order to identify determinants for regional telecom price discrimination, we 
used factors from both demand and supply side of the telecom market into 
consideration. Regional per capita GDP (GDPP) and price elasticity (El) are 
indicators of consumers’ affordability and sensitivity towards prices. The market 
power (MP) is an indicator of firm’s pricing power and their operational cost and 
efficiency. The following multiple regression time-series and cross-section 
regression models are used: 
∆Pit = a + β1MPit + β2Elit + β3GDPPit + εit (5) 
∆PB2 = a + β1MPit + β2Elit + β3GDPPit + εit (6) 
Where market power: MP = (p−mc)/mc (7) 
P is telecom price index charged in regional market and mc is the associated 
marginal cost. The lower the marginal cost, the higher will be the value of MP. The 
firms with higher MP can indicate its strong pricing power due to its lower marginal 
cost. If a firm’s marginal cost is lower relative to its rivals, it will be more 
competitive and has stronger pricing power in the market place. That is, by lowering 
the prices it can push their competitors off the edge. Here we adopted a 
methodology by Wang and Chen (2007) to measure the market power in model (7). 
Market power (MP) can be negatively or positively correlated with regional price 
differences or the price discrimination index (∆P). For instance, for a negative 
correlation between MP and ∆Pit, it means firms have more room to lower its prices 
in the opposite directions of the market power. While in the case of positive 
correlation, MP and ∆P are moving in the same direction. For instance, with the 
higher MP and the higher discrimination pricing index (∆P), firms can gain more 
surplus over the marginal cost by leveraging its pricing power. 
Where price elasticity:  (8) 
q is the total telecom revenue or telecom traffic volumes, and ∆q is a change 
of total revenue or volume; p is telecom price, and ∆p is a change of telecom 
prices. If the underlying telecomm services or products are price elastic, El should 
be negatively correlated with regional price difference or price discrimination 
index. It means when price increases, the demand will drop in terms of sales 
revenue or traffic volumes; and firms will have less room to charge higher prices in 
a price elastic market. 
The regional GDP per capita (GDPP) is an indicator of regional living standard 
or income level or a regional market potential. GDPP and ∆P can be positively or 
negatively correlated. For instance, for a positive correlation, the higher or lower the 
GDPP and higher or lower will be ∆P, when facing an income elastic demand where 
producers have a limit on pricing power to gain consumer surplus. On the other 
hand, for a negative correlation, GDPP and ∆P move in the opposite direction. For 
instance, the higher (lower) the regional GDP per capita (GDPP), the lower (higher) 
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a high GDPP area, the market is more competitive; there are more rivalries and 
substitute services around like free WiFi or more PC usage; it becomes more 
difficult for producers or firms to charge higher prices. While for the lower GDPP 
area, the market is less developed and there are few substitutes for consumers; and 
firms can charge higher prices. 
Based on the panel data in Table 4 (∆Pit) and Table 5(∆PB2), the econometric 
results from regression models (5) and (6) are shown in table 6. 






Constant 0.07*** -0.519*** 
El -1.31*** -1.58*** 
MP -0.040* -0.046** 
GDPP -2.46E-06*** -1.44E-06* 
adjR2 0.11 0.09 
F-statistic 12.64 8.88 
*** P < 0.01; ** P < 0.05; * P < 0.01 
From Table 6, we identified three determinants—price elasticity, market power, 
and per capita of GDP—for regional price discrimination in China’s 
telecommunication market. This result shows that price elasticity El, market 
(pricing) power MP and GDP per capita GDPP are all negatively correlated with 
regional price discrimination index (∆P). ∆P is most sensitive to El of the market 
demand and to a lesser degree to firms’ MP and regional living standard or local 
consumers’ affordability GDPP. Please note these three coefficients cannot be 
compared with one another since measurement for El and MP is between zero and 
multiples, while GDPP is in Chinese yuan (RMB in thousands). 
The negative correlation between price elasticity (El) and regional price 
discrimination index (∆P) indicates firms’ pricing is driven more by demand price 
elasticity, i.e. the higher EL and lower ∆P. The negative correlation between market 
power (MP) and regional price discrimination index (∆P) suggests that when firms 
have higher market power, their larger profit margin or lower marginal cost allows 
them to use less discrimination in pricing and pass along consumer surplus to users. 
While when firms have lower market power, their price is closer to the marginal cost 
and profit margin is lower, and they need to use price discrimination in every 
possible way to squeeze out profit from consumer surplus. 
The negative correlation between regional GDP per capita and regional 
discrimination index indicates price discrimination is higher in poor region and 
lower in rich region although the value of GDPP’s coefficient seems low due to the 
variable scale. It suggests that firms charged lower prices or practiced less price 
discrimination in rich regions but the opposite is the case in poor regions. This 
indicates firm can capture higher consumer surplus in a poor region. 
The negative sign of the coefficients of El and MP indicates that the first degree 
discrimination seems not to be the case in the richer region. Rather firms reacted to 
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the price elasticity of the demand and did not leverage their market power. It 
indicates low price discrimination may lead to a higher propensity to spend for 
customers in richer regions. In richer and more developed market, consumers seem 
to benefit more and firms’ cannot capture higher consumer surplus. 
Further, the negative sign of the coefficients of GDPP suggests that when the 
industry concentration increases, its impact on poor and rich regions is different. The 
reduced number of operators (firms) and competition in this sector or an increase 
market concentration has less impact on rich region but has negative impact on poor 
region. In other words, firms seems to be able to exercise their market power or to 
charge higher prices over their marginal cost in poor regions but have to pass along 
the operational efficiency gain to consumers in the rich regions, despite MP is 
negatively correlated to ∆P on the aggregate level. 
As the market consolidated from seven to three companies (China Mobile, 
China Telecom and China Unicom), the result does not show that producers have 
captured the entire consumer surplus when the industry concentration increased. Yet 
the impact on the richer and poorer regions is different although the overall price 
level declined since 2007 (refer to Tables 4 & 5). 
5. Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that China telecom market is very price elastic. The 
overall price level has declined since 2007 even though the industry has become 
more concentrated. That being said, firms can exercise their market power or pricing 
power more in poor regions but not in rich regions despite the government 
regulating telecom prices. 
The finding of this research may provide insights for government policy 
makers and businesses. Since Aug. 2014, the government telecom pricing regulation 
has shifted from cost based benchmark (by setting price cap) to a market guided 
policy, i.e. to rely on market demand and supply. Under this new policy initiative, 
policy-makers need to pay more attention to protect consumers’ welfare in poor 
regions. Furthermore, policy-makers need to take variation/differences of regional 
ICT network infrastructure into their policy considerations. Because ICT new 
market ecosystem is shaped by rapid development of technology (Xia, 2016), 
growth and expansion is accompanied by mobile virtual network operation 
(MVNOs), apps market (e.g. QQ, Wechat, Alipay, etc.), and info services (e.g. 
Baidu, Sohu, Sina, etc.). As a result, it has changed the competition game and the 
market landscape. The big three telecom firms can maintain their providers’ role of 
network infrastructure, network safety and public service obligation under the 
current government licensing policy. At the same time, this new ecosystem opens 
door and lowers the entry barriers for domestic and foreign entrepreneurs and 
private firms to compete in this industry, especially in areas of MVNOs, apps 
market and information services. This opens up a new vista of good opportunities 
for people living in rural and underdeveloped region in China. To ensure policy 
goals of universal service, free competition and a balance in the country’s regional 
economic development, policy makers need to attract more investments and 
business opportunities to build rural area ICT network infrastructure to lower the 
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access cost for the Internet and telecom services. This will also bring more business 
opportunities for domestic and foreign firms. 
Currently China telecommunication market is still protected from the foreign 
competition and is dominated by three players. For the big three China telecom 
firms, sooner or later they will face more competition in the domestic market as the 
sector will be open to domestic private and foreign competition to fulfill WTO 
agreement. With the upcoming new technologies, they will have no choice but to 
get ready for the global competition although these firms currently are very 
profitable in the home market. For “going global” and internationalization, China 
telecom companies (such as competing in Hong Kong market) have to adapt their 
pricing strategies when a host country’s business environment is different, the 
market power is lower, and their profitability is challenged. For foreign telecom 
companies who want to enter the Chinese market, they need to pay attention to 
regional conditions, for instance, price elasticity, local competition and market 
fragmentations, as well as regulation risks at both central and local government 
levels other than just viewing China as one huge market. Foreign firms also need to 
choose their entry strategies carefully with regards to which regional market they 
will enter, how they will enter, as well as which segment of ICT ecosystem they 
can position their products and services successfully in this newly and evolving 
competitive ICT ecosystem in China. 
Our findings have implications for firm’s pricing strategies. As China’s 
development moves westward (more underdeveloped regions) and faces the 
potentially higher demand for e-commerce and e-finance in rural areas as well as 
rapidly evolving new ICT ecosystem, the future research needs to look into other 
pricing factors such as available substitute services, level of regional ICT 
infrastructure and degree of regional protectionism. From a comparative 
perspective, China is a transition economy. It will be interesting to see how China’s 
experience differs from that of other big emerging markets like India, Brazil, South 
Africa, and Indonesia. 
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